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I wish to begin with undisguised praise for the discipline and thoroughness which are 
evident in this paper. It is a remarkable summary of what is known and unknown about 
the ways that cultural experience may influence argumentative life. Hazen deftly 
navigates through substantial literatures in several disciplines, searching for themes that 
were often invisible to the original investigators. His summaries, both narrative and 
schematic, are valuable in orienting readers who wish an immediate orientation to the 
questions Hazen shows to be both fundamental and often unappreciated. 
 Few things partake more of climate than does culture, and few are more personal 
than arguing. From culture, we inherit ideology, values, expectations, and theories of 
what a person is. In arguing, we express our thoughts, commitments, and reasonings. 
Culture is so atmospheric that it is nearly impossible to perceive from within, while 
arguing is so immediate and present that it is difficult to maintain an external perspective 
on what one is doing during the experience. These and other contrasts are what make 
Hazen's paper so interesting and important. 
 Having had my own thinking made more precise by Hazen's essay, I would like to 
explore again how culture and arguing may be related. 
 The first point I wish to emphasize is how a person actually inherits a culture. 
This is a key question, and I believe that its answer may well underlie many of the 
inconsistencies in the research Hazen explores. Certainly we can identify and describe 
different cultures, but we do so only by examining artifacts produced by individuals. We 
can find key literate statements, such as the Federalist Papers or Augustine's 
Confessions. We can examine spontaneous speech, as when we study naturally occurring 
argumentative exchanges. And we can scrutinize individuals' responses to carefully 
worded survey instruments. But for most scholars, "culture" is a summary. At its most 
visible, it is what Durkheim called a social fact. At its least visible - and it is largely 
invisible when we discover a person apparently living in a culture who doesn't act like it - 
culture is merely a vague suggestion. As Hazen makes clear, we cannot confuse 
nationality with culture. 
 Culture is inherited largely from communication within one's family and 
educational system. From our parents, for instance, we learn who and what to respect, 
and more importantly, we learn the bare idea of respect as well as many others. We come 
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to understand the important or irrelevance of group memberships by participating in our 
own family, and perhaps in other parent-approved groups such as youth organizations or 
sports clubs. In schools, we encounter authority figures, who sometimes act like our 
parents and sometimes not. School lessons deliver cultural values to impressionable 
minds. Sometimes this instruction is explicit, as when we learn a particular version of our 
national history. In other cases, the instruction is less easy to identify. For instance, many 
of us learned math with problems like this: You have six apples and Judy wants two of 
them. If each apple costs 5 cents, how much should Judy pay? This is an arithmetic 
problem, and few look here for ideology. But if you have an excess of apples and Judy 
wants two of them, why don't you just give them to her? This is capitalism's math, and it 
seeps into us at a young age. 
 So the way to think about culture is as an inheritance, and the place to look for it 
is within the individual. Scholarly generalizations about culture derive from our studies of 
national literatures, political systems, kinship relationships, spontaneous methods of 
organizing, structured questionnaires, and many other sources. But these merely suggest 
clues as to what we should look for. Hazen shows that we have excellent reasons to seek 
differences in individualist versus collectivist orientations, expectations about power 
relations, levels of competitive impulse, and similar things. In the work Hazen reviews, 
sometimes researchers found the distinctions they expected and sometimes they did not. 
In each case, the evidence came from individuals, not from common literary possessions 
or similar materials. 
 While the idea of culture is a powerful one, we must be careful in using it to 
describe people. This audience will immediately appreciate that something generally true 
of Japan is not necessarily true of a particular Japanese citizen, and we even have a name 
for that sort of thinking: the fallacy of division. But I think there is an even more 
insidious temptation, to use culture as a literal term when it is properly figurative. In the 
theories we wish to develop, we must avoid animating or personifying culture until we 
have justificatory evidence. We should begin with the idea that culture is not itself an 
agent influencing arguments. It is only a set of possibilities, which may or may not be 
instantiated in a particular person. Certainly we have good reason to suppose that an 
individual will be susceptible to the perceptions that his or her immediate culture makes 
salient, will absorb the expectations that are expressed by those nearby, and will tend to 
act in accord with local rules. But all of these things are matters of degree, and the fact of 
cultural change makes it obvious that cultural resistance is just as permanent as cultural 
adherence.  
 Hazen's paper, combined with his characteristic thoroughness, makes it evident 
that we are missing much of the information that our own community would most like to 
have. Hazen has summarized what material is available, and we can use this as starting 
points. We know a few things about different thresholds for initiating arguments, 
thresholds for responding to challenges, general orientations (e.g., constructive or 
destructive competition), and the strength of various constraints on arguing, such as face 
and politeness. The list of what we don't know, and would like to, is much longer, 
however. We don't know if different cultural orientations point to different sorts of 
evidence, different facility with various argument schemes, different attractiveness of 
various formal and informal fallacies, different levels of clash, different qualities of 
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argument, and many other things represented in the papers at this conference. How 
should we begin to investigate these things? 
 I think our community should go through two stages in pursuing such work, and 
the first is not one we ordinarily spend much time on. We must begin with a serious 
interrogation of whether our research interests are themselves culture specific. We all 
pursue a specialization that was born in Athens, reproduced by the Roman Empire, given 
excruciating detail in the Middle Ages, freely explored in the Renaissance, and reified in 
Western universities. While it is safe to assume that all humans reason, this is no warrant 
for the assumption that they all have the same understanding of what they are doing when 
they engage in what we would call arguing. Even within our own Western cultures, we 
know that ordinary actors have very different meanings for words that you and I would 
collect together. When a conversation goes very badly, they call it an argument; when it 
is peaceable and reaches an easy conclusion, they call it a discussion; when it is 
unresolved but not dangerous, they call it a disagreement. I suppose that every language 
has its own set of words for these and other experiences, and simply identifying and 
matching them up (if that is possible) is a substantial undertaking. Frankly, my worries 
about this issue give me concern about what those survey items meant in Japan, 
Cameroon, and China. Back translation by Western-educated researchers will not detect 
the problems if "argue" has different implications in different language communities. 
 But let me assume that we can do this, and assume further that our Western ideas 
about arguing are the ones we end up endorsing. What is the second step in exploring the 
relations between culture and arguing? Our fundamental task here is to find out whether 
culture is a direct or mediated influence on arguing behaviors. Permit me to illustrate this 
issue in regard to two matters prominent in Hazen's review: engaging in arguments, and 
actual argumentative behaviors. 
 In the West, we have found that people avoid arguments when they are low in 
argumentativeness and high in communication apprehension. Let us suppose that these 
things are also true in some measure in all other cultures. We need to test two different 
models of the relationships among culture, avoidance motivation, and argument 
engagement. Here are the two models. 
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Culture, Anxiety, and Engagement
Culture Anxiety Engagement




Case 2: Culture has a Direct Effect
 
 
 In the first case, culture causes anxiety which in turn causes engagement or 
nonengagement. If this diagram is accurate, we can statistically control anxiety and 
should then find no relationship between culture and engagement behaviors. Without 
controlling anxiety, we would find an apparent correlation between some appropriate 
measure of culture and the engagement behaviors. Case 1 indicates that all of culture's 
power is absorbed into and expressed by individual personality and character.  
 In the second case, however, culture is shown as having both a mediated effect 
and a direct one. Here if we control anxiety, we will still show an association between 
culture and engagement, and this would indicate that not all of culture's influence is 
channeled through individuals. How would we interpret this? A likely way to understand 
the second case is to say that culture is a social fact, and that it therefore constrains what 
people do regardless of their individual inclinations. A standard example of a social fact 
is money. Whether you are aware of it or not, whether you have any of it or not, whether 
you approve of the idea of it or not, in our society money will affect your life. Culture 
may be like that, and the evidence will be that something like the second case is 
supported by empirical data.  
 This strategy can be applied to other questions, questions that might be 
immediately more interesting to conference participants. Hazen shows us that many have 
investigated the nature and importance of politeness and face issues in different cultures. 
In extending this issue, permit me to introduce the idea of hot and cold fallacies. 
 Some fallacies strike me as especially liable to generate emotional reactions. The 
fallacy ad hominem, for instance, might well generate anger. An argument ad 
misericordiam might induce sympathy or disgust, depending on whether the arguer seems 
sincere or is just being a "drama queen." Interruptions and other forms of floor 
domination might well engender resentment. These are examples of hot fallacies. Cold 
fallacies do not immediately lend themselves to these levels of emotionality. 
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Undistributed middle terms, for instance, are just reasoning errors, and affirming the 
consequent might be as well. This is all a matter of degree, I want to emphasize, and it is 
not too early to warn against any attempt to create a secure classification of an argument 
scheme as hot or cold. An ad hominem might be received as loving correction, and a 
fallacy of composition might give rise to accusations of racism. So it will be the 
particular argument rather than its characteristic form that is hot or cold. Still, it does 
seem to me that some of the forms have more potential for emotionality than others. Let 
us suppose this to be so, at least for the moment.  
 In studying the effects of culture on argument production, perhaps we would wish 
to see whether different fallacies are more or less likely in different cultures. We can see 
our basic research question displayed again below. Sensitivity to face issues has taken the 
place of anxiety, and our dependent variable is now the likelihood that a person will 
declare himself or herself willing to use arguments that we have already determined to be 
hot or cold in that culture. 
Culture, Face, and Temperature
Culture Face Sensitivity Average Fallacy Temperature





Case 2: Culture has a Direct Effect
 
 
 I hope a glance will show that our analytical strategy would be the same as for the 
earlier example of anxiety and engagement. Generally speaking, what we need are three 
(or more) phenomena that we can measure, and that we have good reason to suppose are 
related to one another. Exploratory research will need to be done in order to establish that 
the personal variable (anxiety or face sensitivity) is actually related to the outcome 
variable of interest (engagement or temperature) in one or more cultures. Other 
preliminary work will have to be done to ensure that some valid measure of culture is 
associated with the personal variable. With such a basis in the literature, researchers will 




 While I think that this issue of how culture affects arguing behaviors is 
fundamental, quite a lot of other work can be done without worrying about the nature of 
culture's effects. It would be wonderful to know whether bad arguments are universally 
recognized as such: whether personal attacks are rejected at the same levels, whether 
anecdotes are more persuasive in some parts of the world than others, whether slopes are 
equally slippery in all language communities. We would benefit by knowing whether 
engagement and avoidance take the same forms, or in what respects these practices differ. 
In reading Hazen's paper, I frankly wondered whether one culture's explicit conflict was 
the same as another culture's.  
 Many of these questions may strike you as undesirably sociological, and therefore 
someone else's business. However I suspect that we would learn a lot about argument 
schemes by studying those most common elsewhere and wondering whether cultural 
peculiarities could be abstracted in the service of more general descriptions of various 
argument forms. I am sure that study of different arguing behaviors will afford 
stimulating contrasts to our mostly American findings about how people exchange 
reasons face to face.  
 For these and many other reasons, I applaud Hazen's paper. While some of his 
detailed findings are unsatisfying to those, myself included, who would prefer simple 
generalizations, he has shown the fluidity and textured nature of what we presently know 
about the connections between culture and argument. Reading his paper would be an 
excellent first step toward careful investigation of this topic. 
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